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Abstract
We explore the growth and welfare effects of monetary policy in a two-sector Schumpete-
rian economy with cash-in-advance (CIA) constrained R&D investment in both sectors. We
show that a nominal interest rate increase generates two effects on equilibrium labor alloca-
tion: a manufacturing-R&D-reallocation effect and a cross-R&D-sector effect. The former reduces
economic growth by shifting labor from R&D to production, whereas the latter can enhance
it by shifting labor from the less productive R&D sector to the more productive one. Unless
the high productivity R&D sector is severely more CIA-constrained than the low productivity
one, aggregate R&D overinvestment is sufficient but not necessary for the Friedman rule of
monetary policy to be suboptimal. Our benchmark parameterization suggests that a positive
nominal interest rate is optimal despite that it exacerbates the aggregate R&D underinvest-
ment problem.
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In this study, we explore the growth and welfare implications of monetary policy in a Schum-
peterian economy with two vertically related sectors engaging in R&D investment subject to a
cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint. Friedman (1969) proposed a famous monetary policy rule,
known as the Friedman rule, according to which the optimal nominal interest rate is zero. Sub-
sequently, there has been a large body of literature analyzing the optimality of Friedman rule
in different economic environments.1 While zero-nominal-interest-rate targeting was merely a
theoretical possibility before the 2008 global financial crisis, it has become almost a new normal
since then. The short-term nominal interest rates in major developed economies, including the
US, Euro zone, UK, and Japan, have persistently stayed at the near-zero level for over a decade
now (see Huang et al. (2017) and Wu (2021)). This important phenomenon has generated even
more interest in Friedman rule. Several recent studies have examined the (sub)optimality of
Friedman rule by incorporating money demand into R&D-based growth models (e.g., Chu and
Cozzi (2014) and Hori (2020)). The main purpose of this study is to explore the growth and
welfare effects of Friedman rule in a multi-sector economy with CIA-constrained R&D activities.
Our two-sector endogenous growth model is motivated by two stylized facts. First, existing
evidence shows strongly that both downstream and upstream firms actively engage in R&D
activities. For example, Nelson (1986) finds that both upstream and downstream industries have
significant contributions to the US R&D investment. McLaren (1999) and Banerjee and Lin (2003)
document that innovations in the automobile sector in Japan and the US are conducted by both
auto makers and auto parts suppliers. Pillai (2013) shows that new capital equipment invented by
upstream semiconductor equipment firms like Nikon, Canon, and ASML allows microprocessor
firms like Intel and AMD to develop higher performance microprocessors. More recently, Yang
(2020) shows that in the US smartphone market, downstream handset makers (such as Samsung)
build on innovations by upstream chipset firms (such as Qualcomm) to develop new hardware.
Furthermore, our analysis in Section 5.1 using data from the US manufacturing industries shows
that the R&D-to-assets ratios of upstream and downstream firms are similar. The traditional
R&D-based endogenous growth models (for example, Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman
(1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992)) consider research activities only in one sector. This setting
is not suitable for examining how policy affects resource allocation between R&D activities.
Second, recent studies in corporate finance show strongly that R&D investment is subject to
significant financial constraints. For example, Brown et al. (2012) find that the increase in cor-
porate cash flow in the 1990s was the result of firms’ objective to smooth R&D expenditures
by maintaining a buffer stock of liquidity in the form of cash reserves. Falato and Sim (2014)
demonstrate that firms hold cash to finance their R&D investment due to the presence of financ-
ing frictions. Brown and Petersen (2015) find that firms allocate cash reserves to buffer R&D
but do not use cash to protect fixed investment during the recent financial crisis. Furthermore,
Lyandres and Palazzo (2016) show that the sharp increase in the average cash-to-assets ratio for
the US firms since the mid-1980s is driven almost only by firms investing heavily in R&D, and
Ma et al. (2020) report a positive correlation coefficient of 0.41 between the industry-level cash-
and R&D-to-assets ratios in the US. Importantly, our analysis in Section 5.1 shows that the degree
of R&D financial constraints differs significantly between the upstream and downstream sectors,
1See, for example, Ho et al. (2007) and Gahvari (2012).
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suggesting a need to incorporate heterogeneity in CIA constraints in R&D-based growth models.
We develop a scale-invariant version of the quality-ladder growth model with the above fea-
tures. In the model, both the upstream and downstream sectors engage in R&D activities, and
money demand is incorporated through a CIA constraint on R&D investment. We show that
when both upstream and downstream R&D are CIA constrained, a higher nominal interest rate
has two effects on resource reallocation. First, it generates a manufacturing-R&D-reallocation ef-
fect by shifting resources (i.e., labor in this study) from the R&D sectors to the manufacturing
sector due to the increased cost of R&D financing, which reduces economic growth. Second, it
generates a cross-R&D-sector effect by reallocating resources from the more cash-constrained R&D
sector to the less constrained one, which enhances economic growth if the less constrained sec-
tor is more productive, a condition supported by our empirical analysis. We show analytically
that when the cross-sectoral gaps in productivity and CIA constraints are sufficiently large, the
growth-enhancing effect dominates the growth-decreasing effect at low nominal interest rates,
generating an inverted-U relation between economic growth and inflation documented in recent
empirical studies (e.g., López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) and Eggoh and Khan (2014)).
To explore the welfare effects of the Friedman rule of monetary policy (i.e., zero-nominal-
interest-rate targeting), we examine the necessary and sufficient conditions for the suboptimality
of this rule. It is well-known that the equilibrium R&D investment in endogenous growth models
may be above or below the optimal level due to the interplay between positive externalities
(e.g., the intertemporal knowledge spillover effect) and negative externalities (e.g., the business-
stealing effect) of innovations (or in Schumpeter’s term, the "gale of creative destruction"). Chu
and Cozzi (2014) consider a model with R&D only in the upstream sector and show that under
inelastic labor supply, Friedman rule is suboptimal if and only if the equilibrium is characterized
by R&D overinvestment.2 We find that the relation between R&D overinvestment, defined as the
total R&D labor share across the two sectors above the socially optimal R&D labor share, and the
suboptimality of Friedman rule is substantially more complicated in our two-R&D-sector model.
It depends crucially on the relative degree of CIA constraints and the relative R&D productivity
between the two sectors. In light of our empirical evidence, we focus on the environment in
which the productivity of upstream R&D is higher than that of downstream R&D. In this setting,
we show that the equivalence between R&D overinvestment and the suboptimality of Friedman
rule holds only if the upstream-to-downstream CIA constraint ratio is equal to the gross-to-net
markup ratio of the upstream sector. When this condition holds, the two effects mentioned above
completely offset each other for the downstream labor share at the zero interest rate, making it
locally unaffected by an interest rate increase. As a result, our two-R&D-sector model behaves
effectively like the model of Chu and Cozzi (2014).3 As long as the relative CIA constraint
of upstream R&D is below its gross-to-net markup ratio, a weak condition the generally holds,
aggregate R&D overinvestment at the zero nominal interest rate is sufficient but not necessary for
Friedman rule to be suboptimal. By contrast, when the relative CIA constraint of upstream R&D
2When labor supply is elastic, Chu and Cozzi (2014) show that overinvestment is necessary but not sufficient for the
suboptimality of Friedman rule if both consumption and R&D investment are CIA-constrained. Hori (2020) extends
their model by considering heterogeneity in R&D firms’ productivity. He finds that if R&D firms are heterogeneous
(homogeneous), Friedman rule can be suboptimal (is always optimal) under a severe financial constraint.
3Appendix C shows that when R&D productivity is the same in both sectors, or when the downstream markup is
too low to support any positive R&D in that sector, the relation between R&D overinvestment and the suboptimality
of Friedman rule also collapses into that in Chu and Cozzi (2014).
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is above this threshold, R&D overinvestment becomes necessary but not sufficient for Friedman
rule to be suboptimal. Importantly, because the gross-to-net markup ratio is generally far above
one, even if the more productive upstream R&D sector is significantly more CIA-constrained, in
which case the cross-R&D-sector effect is welfare-decreasing, a positive nominal interest rate can
still be welfare-improving in the absence of aggregate R&D overinvestment. This result arises
because a positive interest rate reduces the socially wasteful R&D in the low productivity sector,
the benefits of which can outweigh the costs of reducing socially desirable R&D in the high
productivity sector.
In addition, we perform a quantitative analysis to evaluate the growth and welfare effects
of monetary policy in our model. To facilitate the model calibration, we conduct an empirical
estimation of R&D characteristics, profit margins, and financial constraints in the upstream and
downstream sectors using data from US manufacturing firms. Our calibration features higher
productivity and weaker CIA constraint of R&D in the upstream than in the downstream. The
benchmark case shows that the welfare-maximizing nominal interest rate is positive despite that
R&D is underinvested at the zero nominal rate. Although a positive interest rate further exacer-
bates the overall underinvestment problem, it improves welfare by reducing the inefficient R&D
investment in the low productivity sector. Overinvestment emerges when R&D investment in
both sectors becomes less productive, in which case the welfare costs of zero-nominal-interest-
rate targeting are significantly higher. We further show that when the parameter differences in
productivity and CIA constraints between the sectors are sufficiently large, a positive interest
rate can boost economic growth through the positive cross-R&D-sector labor reallocation effect.
Previous studies have examined extensively the growth and welfare effects of inflation and
Friedman rule, but the impact of the two-R&D-sector structure is largely unexplored in this lit-
erature. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze optimal monetary policy in a
growth-theoretic framework featuring CIA-constrained R&D activities in vertically related indus-
tries. Our analysis yields novel insights, including (i) a new channel for the growth and welfare
effects of monetary policy through the impact of nominal interest rates on resource reallocation
across R&D sectors; (ii) a more general characterization of the relation between suboptimal R&D
investment and the (sub)optimality of Friedman rule that nests the existing results as special
cases; (iii) a novel theoretical result that in an environment with heterogeneous R&D productiv-
ity, a positive nominal interest rate can be welfare-improving even if it exacerbates the overall
R&D underinvestment problem. In addition, our analysis of data from US manufacturing firms
reveals new stylized facts about R&D activities, productivity, and financial constraints in the up-
stream and downstream sectors. The benchmark case of our empirically-calibrated model shows
that a zero-nominal-interest-rate policy maximizes economic growth but a positive nominal in-
terest rate maximizes social welfare. These findings have strong implications for understanding
the long-run effects of the low-interest-rate policy prevalent in recent years.
This study contributes to the growth-theoretic literature on optimal monetary policy that fea-
tures CIA requirements. The pioneering work by Marquis and Reffett (1994) introduces a CIA
constraint on consumption to the Romer (1990) type variety-expansion model to investigate the
effects of monetary policy, and proves that Friedman rule is optimal. The subsequent study
by Chu and Ji (2016) explores the welfare effects of monetary policy in a Schumpeterian quality-
ladder model with endogenous market structure. Unlike their models, the current study analyzes
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optimal monetary policy via a CIA constraint on R&D.4 As mentioned above, our study is closely
related to Chu and Cozzi (2014), who show an equivalence between R&D overinvestment and the
suboptimality of Friedman rule. Their model features R&D activities only in the upstream sector,
so raising the nominal interest rate yields only a reallocating effect on resources from R&D to pro-
duction. Thus, this lowers economic growth and increases welfare only if R&D is overinvested.
We extend their interesting study by considering R&D activities in both the intermediate-good
and final-good sectors. In this setting, in addition to the manufacturing-R&D-reallocation effect,
raising the nominal interest rate can generate a positive growth effect by reallocating labor from
the less productive R&D sector to the more productive one. Furthermore, it can improve welfare
by reducing the socially wasteful R&D investment in the low productivity sector even if the over-
all R&D investment is below the optimal level. Therefore, R&D overinvestment is not necessary
for a positive nominal interest rate to be optimal.
Additionally, this study relates to the recent literature in R&D-based models that explores the
non-monotonic effect of inflation on growth. For example, Chu et al. (2017) find an inverted-U
relation between inflation and growth in a quality-ladder model featuring a random quality im-
provement, whereas Arawatari et al. (2018) find a cutoff inflation level around which inflation and
growth exhibit a negative, nonlinear relation in a variety-expansion model featuring heteroge-
neous R&D abilities. The current study differs from these studies by highlighting the role of the
relative CIA constraint strength and productivity heterogeneity between vertically related sectors
in generating the non-monotonic inflation-growth relation. Recently, Zheng et al. (2021) also find
an inverted-U relation between inflation and growth in a two-R&D-sector Schumpeterian growth
model. Unlike in the current study, R&D in their model is conducted to develop vertical and
horizontal innovations instead of in upstream and downstream industries.5
Finally, we contribute to a growing strand of literature on the effects of government policy in
endogenous growth models with two R&D sectors. Li (2000) analyzes the effectiveness of R&D
subsidies in stimulating economic growth in a two-R&D-sector model with both fully endoge-
nous growth and semi-endogenous growth. Segerstrom (2000) characterizes the long-run growth
effects of R&D subsidies in an endogenous growth model with both vertical R&D and horizontal
R&D. Goh and Olivier (2002) explore optimal patent protection in a variety-expansion growth
model with R&D investment in two vertically related sectors, whereas Chu (2011) addresses a
similar issue in a quality-ladder growth model with R&D investment in two horizontal final-good
sectors. We complement this literature by focusing on the role of monetary policy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup. Section
3 characterizes the decentralized equilibrium and analyzes the growth effect of monetary pol-
icy. Section 4 explores the welfare effects of monetary policy. Section 5 presents a quantitative
analysis. Section 6 concludes.
4See other recent studies, such as Chu et al. (2015), Gil and Iglésias (2020), and Huang et al. (2021), for optimal
monetary policy in endogenous growth models with a CIA constraint on R&D.
5Huang et al. (2021) also examine the growth implications of inflation in a Schumpeterian growth model with en-
dogenous market structure and distinct CIA constraints on quality-improving R&D and variety-expanding R&D. They
find that the short-run effect of inflation on growth differs from the long-run effect, but both effects are monotonic.
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2 Model
We extend a version of the quality-ladder model in Grossman and Helpman (1991) by allow-
ing firms to invest in R&D to develop innovations in both the upstream (i.e., intermediate-good)
and downstream (i.e., final-good) sectors as in Goh and Olivier (2002) and by introducing money
demand via a CIA constraint on R&D investment as in Chu and Cozzi (2014) and Huang et al.
(2017). The nominal interest rate serves as the monetary policy instrument and the effects of
monetary policy are examined by considering the implications of altering the rate of nominal
interest on economic growth and social welfare.
2.1 Households
At time t, each household has a population size of Nt, which grows at the rate of n ≥ 0
such that Ṅt = nNt. There is a unit continuum of identical households, and the lifetime utility





e−ρt ln ctdt, (1)
where ρ > 0 represents the discount rate, and ct is the consumption good for each member. The
law of motion for assets of each household member (expressed in real terms) is
ȧt + ṁt = (rt − n)at + wt + itbt + τt − ct − (πt + n)mt, (2)
where at is the real asset value, rt is the real interest rate, and each individual inelastically
supplies one unit of labor at the real wage rate wt. τt denotes the real lump-sum transfer from
the government, πt is the inflation rate that reflects the cost of holding money, and mt is the real
money balance that the household member holds in order to facilitate entrepreneurs’ loans bt,
which finances R&D investment and pays a nominal interest rate it. We impose a cash-in-advance
(CIA) constraint on the amount of loans available to entrepreneurs: bt ≤ mt.
The household’s optimal problem is to maximize the discounted utility in (1) subject to the
budget constraint in (2) and the CIA constraint. Solving the standard dynamic optimization
yields the familiar Euler equation:
ċt
ct
= rt − ρ − n. (3)
Moreover, using the optimality condition for real money balances mt, we can derive the Fisher
equation: it = πt + rt.
2.2 Final Goods
The final-good sector is referred to as the downstream sector. The aggregate consumption good
in this economy, i.e., Ct = Ntct, is produced by using a unit continuum of differentiated final














where py,t(j) is the price of final good j relative to the consumption good. The differentiated final
goods in each industry j are produced by a monopolistic leader, who holds a patent on the latest
innovation and uses a unit continuum of intermediate goods indexed by k ∈ [0, 1]. This leader’s
products are replaced by the ones of a new entrant who has a more advanced innovation due to









where the parameter z > 1 measures the step size of each quality improvement, qy,t(j) denotes
the number of innovations between time 0 and time t, and xt(j, k) is the quantity of intermediate










is the price index for intermediate goods and px,t(k) is the
price of intermediate good k.
Following previous studies such as Goh and Olivier (2002) and Chu and Cozzi (2014), we as-
sume that intellectual property rights protect inventions in the form of incomplete patent breadth.
The degree of patent breadth in the downstream sector, which is exogenously set by the policy
of patent authority, determines the markup µy > 1 that each final-good monopolist can charge





The monopolistic profit of each differentiated final-good producer is identical and is given by









where the second equality and the third equality are obtained by using (5) and (8), respectively.
Equation (9) implies that given the consumption expenditure Ct, a final-good producer’s profit
Πy,t is increasing in markup µy. Then, using the definition of price index Px,t along with (7), (8),








6We adopt a common assumption in this literature that the replaced leader exits the market. Therefore, there is no
constraint on the markup charged by the new leader other than incomplete patent breath.
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2.3 Intermediate Goods
The intermediate-good sector is referred to as the upstream sector. The environment of the
intermediate-good sector is similar to that of the final-good sector. Each industry in this sec-
tor is temporarily dominated by a monopolist holding the latest innovation, and the industry
leadership is replaced by an entrant who holds a new invention. However, as in the conven-
tional quality-ladder framework, production structure of this sector is different from that of the
previous sector since intermediate goods are produced by manufacturing labor. Specifically, the
production function for the current intermediate-good producer in industry k is given by
xt(k) = z
qx,t(k)Lx,t(k), (11)
where the step size of quality improvement is assumed to be identical to that in the final-good
sector, qx,t(k) is the number of innovations as of time t,7 and Lx,t(k) is the employment of manu-
facturing labor in industry k. Given the pricing strategy of the current leaders in this sector, the
profit-maximizing price is again a constant markup over the marginal cost such that




where the markup µx > 1 captures the degree of patent breadth in the upstream sector, which
is also exogenously set by the policy of patent authority. Accordingly, the monopolistic profit of
each intermediate-good producer is











where the second equality and the third one are obtained by using (10) and (12), respectively.
Given Ct, the impact of the upstream patent breadth µx on the intermediate-good producer’s
profit Πx,t is different from the impact of the downstream patent breadth µy; increasing µx raises
Πx,t due to a larger market power, whereas increasing µy lowers Πx,t due to a smaller demand
for intermediate goods in (10) with the exercise of the final-good producer’s market power.8








implying that the labor demand for intermediate good k is given by Lx,t(k) = Ct/(µxµywt).
7Although the step size z of quality improvement is the same between the final-good and intermediate-good
sectors, the process for the arrival of innovations as stated Section 2.4 implies different numbers of jumps in the
quality ladder in these two sectors as time accumulates. Hence, as will be shown in Section 3.1, the levels of state-of-
the-art technology in these sectors are also different.
8The presence of (1 − 1/µx)/µy in (13) captures the double-marginalization problem as in the traditional industrial
organization literature. See, for example, Chapter 17 in Belleflamme and Peitz (2015) for more details.
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2.4 Innovations and R&D
The creation of innovations for the final-good and intermediate-good sectors is as follows. The
expected value of owning the most recent innovation in industry j (k) in the final- (intermediate-
) good sector is denoted as vy,t(j) (vx,t(k)). Following the standard literature, we focus on a
symmetric equilibrium (see, for example, Cozzi et al. (2007)). This implies that Πy,t(j) = Πy,t
(Πx,t(k) = Πx,t), and that vy,t(j) = vy,t (vx,t(k) = vx,t). Denote by λy,t (λx,t) the aggregate-level
Poisson arrival rate of innovations for final (intermediate) goods. Then, the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation for vy,t (vx,t) is given by
rtvs,t = Πs,t + v̇s,t − λs,tvs,t, (15)
which is the no-arbitrage condition for the asset value in sector s = {y, x}, respectively. In
equilibrium, the return on the asset rtvs,t equals the sum of the flow profits Πs,t, the capital gain
v̇s,t, and the potential losses λs,tvs,t when creative destruction takes place.
New innovations in each industry in the final- (intermediate-) good sector are generated by a
unit continuum of R&D firms indexed by θ ∈ [0, 1] (ϑ ∈ [0, 1]), respectively, and each of the R&D




r,t(ϑ)) for producing inventions. Follow-
ing the existing literature such as Chu and Cozzi (2014) and Huang et al. (2017), we incorporate
a CIA constraint on R&D investment as follows. In order to finance the wage payment, wtL
y
r,t(θ),
for the downstream-R&D labor, the θ-th entrepreneur has to borrow B
y
t (θ) = b
y
t (θ)Nt at time t
from households. This loan matures instantaneously and creates an extra burden of an inter-
est payment at the nominal interest rate it ≥ 0. Similarly, the ϑ-th entrepreneur has to borrow
Bxt (ϑ) = b
x
t (ϑ)Nt from households to finance wage payment, wtL
x
r,t(ϑ), for the upstream-R&D
labor. Thus, the expected profit of the χ-th R&D firm, where χ = {θ, ϑ}, is
Π
s
r,t(χ) = vs,tλs,t(χ)− (1 + ξsit)wtL
s





∈ [0, 1] is the strength of the CIA constraint on downstream R&D and up-







Lsr,t(χ); s = {y for θ, x for ϑ} , (17)
where the specification ϕ̄s,t = ϕs/Nt captures the dilution effect that removes scale effects as in




is the productivity parameter for downstream R&D
and upstream R&D, respectively. In equilibrium, the aggregate-level arrival rate of innovations
is thus given by λs,t =
∫ 1








r,t(χ)dχ is the aggregate labor
devoted to the s = {y, x} R&D sector. Then, free entry into the R&D sectors implies the following
zero-expected-profit condition:
vs,tλs,t = (1 + ξsit)wtL
s
r,t; s = {y, x} . (18)
This equation is a condition pinning down the allocation of labor in the R&D sectors.
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2.5 Monetary Authority
Denote the nominal money supply by Mt and its growth rate by Φt ≡ Ṁt/Mt, respectively.
Accordingly, the real money balance is given by mtNt = Mt/pt, where pt is the price of consump-
tion. Consider that the growth rate of money supply Φt serves as a policy instrument that can be
controlled by monetary authority. In this case, the rate of inflation is endogenously determined
by πt = Φt − ṁt/mt − n. Additionally, combining this condition with the Fisher equation (i.e.,
it = πt + rt) yields the one-to-one relation between the nominal interest rate and the nominal
money supply in the balanced growth path equilibrium:9
it = Φt + ρ. (19)
Given this result, throughout the rest of this study, we will use it to represent the instrument of
monetary policy for simplicity. Finally, the monetary authority redistributes to the households
the increase in money supply (i.e., the seigniorage revenue) in terms of a lump-sum transfer,
namely τtNt = Ṁt/pt = ΦtmtNt = [(πt + n)mt + ṁt]Nt.
3 Decentralized Equilibrium







and a sequence of prices [rt, py,t(j), px,t(k), wt, vy,t, vx,t]∞t=0, where {j, k, θ, ϑ} ∈ [0, 1]. At each in-
stance of time,
• households choose [ct] to maximize their utility taking [rt, it, wt] as given;
• monopolistic leaders for final goods produce [Yt(j)] and choose [py,t(j)] to maximize profits
taking [px,t(k)] as given;
• monopolistic leaders for intermediate goods produce [xt(k)] and choose [px,t(k), Lx,t(k)] to
maximize profits taking [wt] as given;
• competitive downstream-R&D firms choose [L
y
r,t(θ)] to maximize profits taking [wt, vy,t] as
given;
• competitive upstream-R&D firms choose [Lxr,t(ϑ)] to maximize profits taking [wt, vx,t] as
given;
• the consumption-good market clears: ctNt = Ct;





• the innovation value adds up to households’ asset value: vx,t + vy,t = atNt;






• the monetary authority balances its budget: τtNt = (it − ρ)mtNt.
3.1 Balanced Growth Path
This section characterizes the decentralized equilibrium and shows that the economy grows
along a balanced growth path (BGP) that is saddle-point stable. To facilitate this result, we first
9On the balanced growth path, which will be shown in Section 3.1, ct and mt grow at the same rate of rt − ρ − n
according to the Euler equation.
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derive the growth rate of aggregate technology gt. Substituting (6) and (11) into (4) yields the
consumption production function Ct = Zy,tZx,tLx,t, where Zy,t and Zx,t are defined as the level of

























, respectively. The sec-
ond equalities in these equations are obtained by the law of large numbers. Differentiating these





















defined as downstream-R&D labor share and upstream-R&D labor share, respectively. Similarly,
lx,t ≡ Lx,t/Nt is defined as manufacturing labor share. Therefore, the growth rate of per capita
consumption ċt/ct (i.e., the economic growth rate) is also given by gt in (20).
For an arbitrary path of the nominal interest rate [it]∞t=0, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1. Holding constant i, the economy jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced
growth path.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
3.2 Equilibrium Allocations and the Growth Effect





are stationary along the BGP. Using the zero-expected-profit condition for upstream R&D (18)
and the manufacturing-labor income in the intermediate-good sector (14) yields vy,tλy,t = (1 +
ξyi)Ctl
y
r,t/(µxµylx), implying v̇y,t/vy,t = ċt/ct + n. Combining this result with (3) and (15) and im-
posing the BGP implies Πy/vy = ρ + λy. Then, substituting this equation into (18) and applying
















r }. Following a similar logic, we can use (4), (13),









Combined with the labor-market-clearing condition lx + lxr + l
y
r = 1, equations (21)-(22) yield the
equilibrium labor allocations as follows:10
lx =
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy






































In these equilibrium labor allocations, (23) shows that manufacturing labor lx is increasing in
the nominal interest rate i, because a higher i raises the cost of borrowing for R&D investment,
which reallocates the labor from R&D to manufacturing. Nevertheless, (24) reveals that there
are two effects of i on the downstream-R&D labor l
y
r . On the one hand, i has a negative effect
on l
y
r due to the reallocation of labor to production as aforementioned (i.e., the manufacturing-
R&D-reallocation effect). On the other hand, i has a negative (positive) effect on l
y
r if ξy is greater
(smaller) than ξx, namely downstream R&D is more (less) bound by the CIA constraint than
upstream R&D. This creates another reallocative effect of labor between the two R&D sectors:
the cross-R&D-sector effect. Whether a higher i increases or decreases l
y
r depends on the relative
magnitudes of ξy and ξx and the level of markup µx.
Specifically, when ξy > ξx, the cross-R&D-sector effect is negative and thus reinforces the
manufacturing-R&D-reallocation effect, causing l
y
r to be decreasing in i. When ξy < ξx, the cross-
R&D-sector effect on l
y
r becomes positive. Nevertheless, it is easy to show that if ξx is smaller
(larger) than [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy, the overall effect of an increase in i on l
y
r is negative (positive)
at i = 0.11 In other words, as long as the upstream-to-downstream CIA constraint ratio is
lower than the gross-to-net markup ratio of the upstream sector, the positive cross-R&D-sector
effect is dominated by the negative manufacturing-R&D-reallocation effect. Interestingly, when
ξx = [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy, the two effects completely offset each other at i = 0, leaving l
y
r locally
unaffected by changes in i.
Similarly, (25) shows that i also has these two effects on the upstream-R&D labor lxr , which
reinforce each other when ξx > ξy and counteract each other when ξx < ξy. The analysis of the




We summarize the above results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. In the zero-nominal-interest-rate equilibrium, the interaction of the manufacturing-R&D-
reallocation effect and the cross-R&D-sector effect leads to the following labor share responses to a nominal
interest rate increase:
(i) If ξx = [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy, the two effects on l
y
r offset each other, leaving l
y
r locally unaffected by an
interest rate increase; otherwise (∂l
y
r /∂i)|i→0+ ≶ 0 if ξx ≶[µx/(µx − 1)]ξy.
(ii) If ξy ={1+ 1/[µx(µy − 1)]}ξx, the two effects on lxr offset each other, leaving l
x
r locally unaffected
by an interest rate increase; otherwise (∂lxr /∂i)|i→0+ ≶ 0 if ξy ≶{1 + 1/[µx(µy − 1)]}ξx.
Proof. Proven in the text.
The above result and (20) imply a mixed effect of the nominal interest rate i on the equilibrium




r ), and this effect is determined by the impacts of i
11More generally, we have Sign(∂l
y
r /∂i) = Sign[(µx − 1)(ξx − ξy)− ξy(1 + ξxi)
2].
12It is easy to show that Sign(∂lxr /∂i) = Sign[µx(µy − 1)(ξy − ξx)− ξx(1 + ξyi)
2].
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r in addition to the productivity parameters ϕy and ϕx. Using



























ϕyµx(µy − 1)[(µx − 1)(1 + ξyi)ξx − (µx + ξxi)(1 + ξxi)ξy]




where Λ ≡ (1+ ξyi)(1+ ξxi) + (µx − 1)(1+ ξyi) + µx(µy − 1)(1+ ξxi). It can be checked that the
term in the curly brackets is decreasing in i and that Λ is increasing in i, so ∂g/∂i is decreasing
in i, namely g is a concave function of i. Notice that if the following condition holds,
ϕx
ϕy










the term in the curly brackets in (26) is positive at i = 0, implying (∂g/∂i)|i→0+ > 0. Therefore,
condition (27) ensures that the relation between g and i is first positive and then negative. Further















we have the following proposition:13
Proposition 3. There is an inverted-U relation between the equilibrium growth rate g and the nominal
interest rate i if
(i) ξx < ξy and ϕy/ϕx < Ω, or
(ii) ξx > [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy and ϕy/ϕx > Ω;
otherwise, the relation is monotonically negative.
Proof. Proven in the text.
This proposition shows that for the nominal interest rate to have an inverted-U effect on
economic growth, the more productive sector should both have a large lead in productivity
and face a much weaker CIA constraint. For example, the condition ϕy/ϕx < Ω holds when
ϕy/ϕx is very small and (ξy − ξx)/ξx is very large, i.e., when upstream R&D is far more pro-
ductive and less constrained than downstream R&D. These conditions pave ground for a strong
cross-R&D-sector labor reallocation effect to dominate the negative effect of the manufacturing-
R&D-reallocation on growth. Thus, an increase in the nominal interest rate from zero is growth-
enhancing. Notwithstanding, as i increases, the dominance of the cross-R&D-sector effect dimin-
ishes, and further increases in the interest rate become growth-decreasing.
13Note that when ξy < ξx < [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy, Ω is negative. As a result, it is impossible to have a non-monotonic
relation between the interest rate and growth.
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3.3 Socially Optimal Allocations














r ). Dropping the exogenous terms Zx,0 and Zy,0 and




r = 1 yields the first-best














1 − ρϕylnz if ϕx < ϕy,




0 if ϕx < ϕy,
1 − ρϕxlnz if ϕx > ϕy.
(32)
The socially optimal outcome implies that technology advances in the downstream and up-
stream sectors are perfectly substitutable. Therefore, a corner solution arises for the first-best
labor allocations in the sense that the social optimum only allocates labor to the R&D sector with
a higher level of productivity.14 Specifically, suppose ϕy < ϕx, that is, innovative activities in
the upstream sector are more productive, so that devoting all R&D labor to this sector is socially
optimal. As a result, the labor in the downstream R&D sector is zero, implying that economic
growth in the social optimum only depends on upstream innovations. By contrast, for ϕy > ϕx,
the situation reverses, and R&D labor is only allocated to the downstream sector.
Define the R&D overinvestment, η, in the zero-nominal-interest-rate equilibrium as the gap
between the R&D labor share in the decentralized equilibrium (given by (24) and (25)) and the






r ) = l
∗
x − lx|i=0. Under the assumption
















We immediately have the following proposition:
Proposition 4. If upstream R&D is more productive than downstream R&D, i.e., ϕx > ϕy, the zero-













14If the productivity is the same in the two R&D sectors (ϕx = ϕy = ϕ), the first-best manufacturing-labor share is








r = 1 − ρ/(ϕlnz) is socially optimal.
14
Proof. Proven in the text.
Proposition 4 is intuitive, and it implies that R&D underinvestment arises in equilibrium
(i.e., η < 0) if and only if 1 − [(ϕx ln z)/(µxµyρ)](1 + ρ/ϕx + ρ/ϕy) < 0. For overinvestment to
occur in equilibrium, the markups must be relatively high so that firms have strong incentives
to invest in R&D. A larger innovation step size lnz and a higher ϕx increase the socially optimal
investment, thus making overinvestment less likely. A higher ϕy increases the equilibrium R&D
labor in the downstream sector but has no effect on the socially optimal R&D labor share as
long as ϕy < ϕx. Therefore, it makes overinvestment more likely. A higher ρ reduces the utility
of future consumption, thus also reducing the optimal investment and making overinvestment
more likely.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy and Friedman Rule
In this section, we analyze the optimal monetary policy and examine the conditions under
which Friedman rule is (sub)optimal. We first consider the general case, and then consider two
special cases in which the CIA constraint is only present in one sector. We denote by i∗ the
optimal nominal interest rate that maximizes social welfare. Given that the case ϕy < ϕx is
empirically supported by our analysis in Section 5.1, throughout the remaining study, we focus
on the case of a high relative R&D productivity in the upstream sector.15
4.1 The General Case
For the general case of CIA constraints with ξy ≥ 0, ξx ≥ 0, and ξx + ξy > 0, the equilib-
rium labor allocations are simply given by (23)-(25). Substituting these equations into (29) and





























ϕxξx(µx − 1) + ϕyξyµx(µy − 1)









Given ϕy < ϕx, we analyze the relation between suboptimal R&D investment and the (sub)optimality
of Friedman rule. We show that this relation depends on the relative magnitude of CIA con-
straints ξx and ξy.
First, suppose that the CIA constraint in the upstream sector is not stronger than in the
downstream sector, i.e., ξy ≥ ξx. Denote the right-hand side of (35) by K. In this case, if R&D



















15The analytical results of a low relative productivity of upstream R&D (i.e., ϕy > ϕx) are available upon request.
Furthermore, we show in Appendix C that the results of our model would be the same as those in the one-R&D-sector
model of Chu and Cozzi (2014) if the R&D productivity is the same in both sectors, i.e., ϕx = ϕy.
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This shows that R&D overinvestment is sufficient for Friedman rule to be suboptimal. Intuitively,
if the low productivity downstream R&D is more constrained, when i is raised from the zero
level, the cross-R&D-sector effect stimulates technology growth through shifting R&D labor from




r ). In addition, the







r ) and increases current consumption toward its optimal level (i.e., moving
lx closer to l
∗
x). Consequently, these two effects unambiguously improve the overall welfare,
leading to a positive optimal nominal interest rate i∗.
One implication of this result is that R&D underinvestment is necessary but not sufficient for
the optimality of Friedman rule in this case. In particular, Appendix A.2 shows that Friedman
rule can be suboptimal even if R&D is underinvested. This is not surprising because the cross-
R&D-sector labor reallocation is socially beneficial. Therefore, even though a reduction in the
total R&D labor is undesirable in the presence of underinvestment, the overall effect of a positive
interest rate may still be positive. Our model thus leads to a very novel insight: In the presence of
heterogeneous productivity across sectors, a reduction in the overall investment in R&D can be
welfare-improving even if the aggregate amount of R&D investment is below the optimal level.
Second, suppose that the CIA constraint in the more productive upstream sector is stronger
than in the less productive downstream sector, i.e., ξy < ξx. In this case, when i is raised from the
zero level, the cross-R&D-sector effect yields a negative impact on welfare by stifling technology
growth, given that R&D labor is shifted from the more productive sector to the less productive
sector (i.e., from lxr to l
y
r ). One may conjecture Friedman rule to be suboptimal only if R&D is
overinvested at i = 0. Interestingly, Appendix A.2 shows that this is not the case as long as
upstream R&D is not severely more CIA-constrained than downstream R&D.
Specifically, as long as ξx < [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy, R&D overinvestment is sufficient but not neces-
sary for Friedman rule to be suboptimal. Note that the condition ξx < [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy always
holds if ξx < ξy. Therefore, this result nests the result discussed above for the case with a weaker
CIA constraint in the upstream than in the downstream. In fact, the gross-to-net markup ratio
µx/(µx − 1) is generally far above 1, allowing the result to hold even when upstream R&D is
significantly more CIA-constrained than downstream R&D. Therefore, this is a general result
applicable to most empirically relevant situations. The intuition for this result is as follows. As
shown in Proposition 2, as long as ξx < [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy, an increase in the nominal interest rate
from zero reduces R&D labor in the low productivity downstream sector, l
y
r . Since the socially
optimal l
y∗
r is zero, a reduction in l
y
r is welfare-improving. Appendix A.2 shows that in this case,
if the degree of R&D underinvestment is relatively low (which is supported by relatively high
markup values of µx and/or µy), the welfare benefit of decreasing the socially wasteful R&D in
the low productivity sector can dominate the welfare cost of decreasing the socially desirable
R&D investment in the high productivity sector. This may be true even when lxr is more sensitive
to the interest rate increase than l
y
r , as in the case with ξy < ξx < [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy.
When the upstream CIA constraint is much stronger than the downstream one, i.e., ξx >
[µx/(µx − 1)]ξy, R&D overinvestment becomes necessary but not sufficient for Friedman rule
to be suboptimal. In other words, R&D underinvestment is sufficient but not necessary for
Friedman rule to be optimal. In this case, the cross-R&D-sector effect becomes so favorable to
the less productive downstream R&D sector that the downstream R&D labor share responds
positively to an increase in the intererst rate from zero. As a result, a positive interest rate only
16
decreases the labor share of the more productive upstream sector. Not surprisingly, it can be
welfare-improving only if R&D is overinvested at i = 0. Furthermore, because a positive interest
rate triggers an undesirable reallocation of labor from the high productivity sector to the low
productivity one, overinvestment is not sufficient to ensure its optimality.
Finally, in the knife-edge case of ξx = [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy, the analysis of equation (24) in Section
3.2 shows that in the equilibrium with i = 0, l
y
r becomes locally unaffected by changes in i.
Therefore, the nominal interest rate only affects the allocation between the production sector and
upstream R&D. In this case, our model effectively reduces to the model of Chu and Cozzi (2014)
in terms of the labor allocation effect of interest rate changes. As a result, R&D overinvestment
becomes both sufficient and necessary for Friedman rule to be suboptimal.
Accordingly, we summarize the above results in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. Suppose that upstream R&D is more productive than downstream R&D, i.e., ϕy < ϕx.
Then for the general case of CIA constraints with ξx ≥ 0, ξy ≥ 0, and ξx + ξy > 0, we have
(i) if upstream R&D is not much more constrained than downstream R&D, i.e., ξx < [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy,
R&D overinvestment is sufficient but not necessary for Friedman rule to be suboptimal. In other words,
Friedman rule can be suboptimal even with R&D underinvestment;
(ii) if upstream R&D is much more constrained than downstream R&D, i.e., ξx > [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy,
R&D overinvestment is necessary but not sufficient for Friedman rule to be suboptimal;
(iii) in the special case with ξx = [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy, R&D overinvestment is necessary and sufficient
for Friedman rule to be suboptimal.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Due to the complexity of the model, it is difficult to obtain the closed-form solution for the
optimal nominal interest rate i∗ when both R&D sectors are CIA constrained except for the special
case with ξy = ξx. Therefore, we examine numerically the level of i∗ in Section 5.16
4.2 Special Cases: CIA Constraint in One Sector
We next consider two special cases. The first is the case where only downstream R&D is
CIA-constrained (i.e., ξy > 0 and ξx = 0). The equilibrium labor allocations in this case are
obtained by imposing ξx = 0 in (23) to (25). It is easy to see that manufacturing-labor share
lx is increasing in the nominal interest rate i, whereas downstream- (upstream-) R&D labor is
decreasing (increasing) in i. Given that upstream R&D is not cash-constrained (i.e., ξy > ξx = 0),
the effect of i operates only through the constraint on the downstream R&D sector. A higher i
increases the cost of downstream R&D, leading to a labor reallocation from downstream R&D to
both upstream R&D and manufacturing.
16The analytical solution for i∗ when ξx = ξy = ξ > 0 can be derived by differentiating U with respect to i. Solving
































By differentiating U with respect to i and solving the first-order condition, we can obtain the






























and the value of i∗ is chosen based on the sign of (∂U/∂i)|i=0.
Given that this case satisfies the condition ξx = 0 < [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy, Proposition 5(i) holds.
Therefore, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Suppose that only downstream R&D is CIA-constrained. Then the optimal nominal interest
rate i∗ is given by (37). Furthermore, when ϕy < ϕx, R&D overinvestment in the zero-nominal-interest-
rate equilibrium is sufficient but not necessary for Friedman rule to be suboptimal.
The second is the case where only upstream R&D is CIA-constrained (i.e., ξx > 0 and ξy = 0).
By imposing ξy = 0 on the equilibrium labor allocations (23) to (25), it is easy to see that a higher
nominal interest rate increases the manufacturing labor lx and R&D labor in the unconstrained
downstream sector lry, while decreasing the R&D labor in the constrained upstream sector l
r
x.
Moreover, by differentiating U with respect to i and solving the first-order condition, we can

























Because the condition ξx > [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy = 0 is satisfied in this case, Proposition 5(ii)
holds. Therefore, we have the following corollary: 2.
Corollary 2. Suppose that only upstream R&D is CIA-constrained. Then the optimal nominal interest
rate i∗ is given by (38). Furthermore, when ϕy < ϕx, R&D overinvestment in the zero-nominal-interest-
rate equilibrium is necessary but not sufficient for Friedman rule to be suboptimal.
5 Quantitative Analysis
We now provide a quantitative analysis of the growth and welfare effects of monetary policy.
In Section 5.1, we show the empirical patterns of upstream and downstream firms. In Section 5.2,
we calibrate our model to the US economy. Sections 5.3 to 5.5 present the quantitative results.
5.1 Upstream vs. Downstream: Empirical Patterns
To guide our model calibration, we examine the R&D characteristics, profit margins, returns
on assets, and financial constraints in the upstream and downstream sectors using firm-level
data from US manufacturing industries from 1985 to 2018. We focus on manufacturing firms
because they account for the majority of US R&D spending and corporate patents (see, e.g.,
Autor et al. (2020)). We use the 2002 US Bureau of Economic Analysis Benchmark Input-Output
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(I-O) Tables to classify firms into two sectors. These tables track the flows of intermediate goods
and services across industries, as well as the sales of each industry to final users. Following
Antràs et al. (2012) and Gofman et al. (2020), we compute an upstreamness index for each I-O
industry.17 We merge the industry-level upstreamness measure with the firm-level financial data
from the Compustat North America database using the mapping between the I-O industry codes
and the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. A firm’s upstreamness is
assigned based on its historical NAICS code. We then merge our sample with the patent database
compiled by Kogan et al. (2017). We keep only firms in manufacturing industries (defined by two-
digit NAICS codes 31, 32, and 33). Furthermore, we exclude R&D inactive firms with zero R&D
capital (defined in Appendix B). We deflate all dollar values to 2002 dollars using the GDP
deflator and exclude firms with sales or assets less than $1 million. Our final sample consists of
3,738 firms with a total of 40,411 annual observations.
We construct several variables relevant to our model: (i) A dummy variable, Upstream, which
equals one if a firm’s upstreamness index is above the annual cross-sectional median and zero
otherwise. (ii) R&D ratio, which is the ratio of annual R&D expenditures to the book value of
total assets. Following the convention in the literature, missing R&D expenditures are assumed
to be zero. (iii) Profit margin, equal to the ratio of operating income before depreciation to
total sales. (iv) Return on enterprise value (ROEV), computed as the ratio of operating income
before depreciation to the enterprise value (book value of debt plus market value of equity minus
cash holdings). (v) A widely used index of financial constraints, the Whited-Wu (WW) Index,
calculated using formula (13) in Whited and Wu (2006).18 (vi) Two R&D productivity measures,
Prod(I) and Prod(II), which are estimated using two alternative patent-based measures of R&D
output relative to R&D input.19
We run univariate regressions to uncover the differences between the upstream and down-
stream firms, controlling for year fixed effects, and report the results in Table 1. To account
for the fact that bigger firms play a more important role in the economy than small ones, each
observation is weighted by the lagged firm assets. Column (1) shows that the (asset-weighted)
average R&D ratios in the two sectors are statistically indistinguishable, although the point esti-
mate for the upstream sector is 21% higher relative to the downstream sector. This is consistent
with our assumption that both upstream and downstream firms engage in R&D. Columns (2)
and (3) show that profit margins and returns on enterprise value (ROEV) are also very similar
across the two sectors, at around 18% and 9%, respectively. However, column 4 (5) shows that the
R&D productivity is 59% or 73% higher in the upstream sector than in the downstream sector,
depending on whether productivity is measured by Prod(I) or Prod(II).
To examine the potentially different degrees of financial constraints for upstream and down-
stream R&D, we regress the WW index on the R&D ratio for the downstream and upstream sec-
tors separately. The results presented in the last two columns of Table 1 show that a high R&D
17See Appendix B for the details about the construction of this index. Intuitively, an industry’s upstreamness index
is the weighted average of its customer industries’ upstreamness indexes plus 1. Industries producing only goods and
services for personal consumption form the bottom layer of production and have the lowest upstreamness index of 1.
18This measure can be interpreted as the shadow cost of external financing. Technically, Formula (13) in Whited and
Wu (2006) gives a number equal to the shadow cost of external financing plus an unknown constant. We adjust each
firm’s index by subtracting the cross-sectional minimum in each year to pin down this constant, essentially assuming
that the shadow cost of external financing is zero for the least constrained firms.
19The difference between Prod(I) and Prod(II) lies in the adjustment for patent citations (see Appendix B).
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Table 1: Upstream vs. downstream manufacturing firms: empirical patterns
The table shows the results from weighted regressions using annual observations of US manufacturing
firms from 1985 to 2018. Columns (6) and (7) report the results for the downstream and upstream
samples, respectively. Each observation is weighted by lagged total assets. All models include year
dummies and the intercept term is computed as the mean of ȳ − b̂x̄. Standard errors are clustered by
industry, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
R&D Ratio Profit Margin ROEV Prod(I) Prod(II) WW Index WW Index
(Downstream) (Upstream)
Upstream 0.007 -0.011 -0.001 0.079*** 0.100***
(0.54) (-0.45) (-0.14) (3.17) (3.34)
R&D Ratio 0.736*** 0.254***
(3.45) (3.57)
Constant 0.034*** 0.186*** 0.091*** 0.134*** 0.137*** 0.064*** 0.146***
(3.80) (8.92) (16.40) (7.61) (5.74) (4.59) (19.50)
Observations 37811 37741 37678 23218 23218 18728 18902
intensity is associated with tightened financial constraints in both sectors, consistent with the
idea that R&D activities tend to face significant financial constraints, an underlying assumption
of our model. More interestingly, this correlation is significantly stronger for the downstream
sector than for the upstream sector. Specifically, a one percentage point increase in the R&D
ratio corresponds to an increase in the WW index by 73.6 (25.4) basis points for downstream
(upstream) firms.20 This suggests that downstream R&D is substantially more financially con-
strained than upstream R&D, potentially because upstream R&D investment generates patents
more efficiently, which can serve as collateral for external financing.
5.2 Calibration
There are nine structural parameters in our model:
{
ρ, n, µx, µy, z, ξx, ξy, ϕx, ϕy
}
. We estimate
three of them, n, µx, and µy, directly from the data. According to the data retrieved from FRED,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the annual population growth rate in the US from 2000 to 2020
is 0.8%. Therefore, we set at n = 0.8%. Table 1 shows that the profit margins in the upstream and
downstream sectors are 0.175 and 0.186, respectively. Accordingly, we set the values of the two
markup parameters at µx = 1.175 and µy = 1.186.
We then calibrate the remaining six parameters {ρ, z, ξx, ξy, ϕx, ϕy} by matching six model-
implied moments in the steady state to empirical data. The empirical moments are estimated
as follows. First, the growth rate of real GDP per capita in the US is 1.0% during the period
2000-2020 (according to data retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). Second,
Lanjouw (1998) finds that the obsolescence rate of a patented innovation is in the range of 7 −
12%. We use this as a proxy for the aggregate innovation arrival rate. The remaining four
moments are inferred from our estimation results in Table 1. (i) Column (4) in Table 1 shows that
the relative R&D productivity ratio of the upstream sector is ϕx/ϕy = 1.59 (0.213 vs. 0.134). (ii)
20A regression using the full sample and the upstream dummy shows that this difference is statistically significant
at the 5% level (with a t-statistic of -2.16).
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Table 2: Benchmark parameter values
Panel A. Parameter Values
Directly estimated parameter values Calibrated parameter values
Upstream price markup (µx) 1.175 Subjective discount rate (ρ) 0.04
Downstream price markup (µy) 1.186 Step size of innovation (z) 1.105
Population growth rate (n) 0.8% Upstream CIA constraint (ξx) 0.271
Downstream CIA constraint (ξy) 0.775
Upstream R&D productivity (ϕx) 0.645
Downstream R&D productivity (ϕy) 0.451
Panel B. Empirical vs. Model Moments
Moments Data Model Moments Data Model
Per capita economic growth rate (g) 1.0% 0.9% Innovation arrival rate (λx + λy) 7-12% 9.0%
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The last two columns of Table 1 show that the relative CIA constraint for upstream R&D (ξx/ξy)
is 0.35 (25.4 vs. 73.6). (iii) Column (1) in Table 1 shows that the relative R&D ratio of the upstream




r ) in our model, because
equation (18) shows that the R&D ratio for sector s ∈ {x, y} is wtLsr,t(χ)(1 + ξsi)/vs,t = ϕsl
s
r . (iv)
Column (3) in Table 1 shows that the average ROEV of the upstream and downstream sectors,
which corresponds to (Πx/vx + Πy/vy)/2 in our model based on (3) and (15), is 9.1%.
Table 2 summarizes the benchmark parameter values, as well as the theoretical moments
and their empirical counterparts. Note that to determine the steady state equilibrium, we set
π = 2.1%, matching the US inflation rate from 2000 to 2020. All the moments are matched
remarkably well.21 The equilibrium economic growth rate is g = 0.9%, which is close to the per
capita GDP growth in the US from 2000 to 2020 (1%) and the long-run TFP growth rate from
1954 to 2019 (0.7%, according to data from Feenstra et al. (2015)). The implied nominal interest
rate is i = ρ + g + n + π = 7.8%, which is close to the 10-year US Treasury rate from 1970 to 2020
(6.21%) after taking into account the convenience yields of Treasury bonds.22 Our parameter
choices are also consistent with the values used or estimated in the literature. Specifically, a
subjective discount rate of 4% is used in García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2006), among others.
Furthermore, Akcigit and Kerr (2018) estimate a net step size of 11.2% for major advances in
technology, which is in line with our gross step size of z = 1.105.
5.3 Benchmark Simulation
Based on the calibrated parameters, we proceed to evaluate the growth and welfare effects of
monetary policy. Figure 1(a) indicates that in this benchmark case, the steady-state growth rate
of aggregate technology (and also the rate of economic growth) g is monotonically decreasing in
21The small discrepancies arise because parameter values must fall in a certain range to be economically meaningful.
For example, none of the parameters can be negative, and the CIA-constraint parameters must be in the [0, 1] interval.
22The average Moody’s Seasoned AAA corporate bond yield over this period is 7.36%.
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the inflation rate.23 In particular, increasing the inflation rate from the benchmark value 2.1% to
15% causes the equilibrium growth rate to decline from 0.9% to 0.83%.24 Intuitively, (24) and (25)
show that a higher nominal interest rate i raises the costs of both downstream R&D and upstream
R&D due to CIA constraints in these sectors. As discussed in Proposition 3, since the condition
ϕyµx(µy − 1)[(µx − 1)ξx − µxξy] + ϕx(µx − 1)[µx(µy − 1)ξy − (µxµy − µx + 1)ξx] = −0.1033 < 0
holds, the manufacturing-R&D-reallocation effect tends to dominate the cross-R&D-sector effect,
thereby leading to a monotonic decrease in the rate of economic growth.
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(a) Inflation and economic growth
-8 -5 -3 0 2 5 8 10 12 15

















(b) Inflation and social welfare
Figure 1: The benchmark case
Interestingly, the steady-state welfare has an inverted-U relation with the inflation rate, as
shown in Figure 1(b). The manufacturing-R&D reallocation caused by a higher i leads to a rise in




r , which, according to (29), increases the level of current consumption
c0 (i.e., a positive welfare effect) but decreases the growth rate g (i.e., a negative welfare effect).
Another positive welfare effect arises from the cross-R&D-sector R&D labor reallocation from
the less productive downstream sector to the more productive upstream sector. Together, these
positive welfare effects dominate the negative effect when the inflation rate is low, but they
become dominated as the inflation rate goes beyond the optimal level, which in the benchmark
case is 1.2%, corresponding to an optimal nominal interest rate of 6.9%. Therefore, Friedman rule
is suboptimal in our benchmark parameterization.
Given the higher relative productivity of upstream R&D (i.e., ϕy < ϕx), (30)-(32) indicate
that all R&D labor should be allocated to the upstream sector to achieve the socially optimal
outcome (i.e., l
y∗




r = 0.3799 and the
total R&D labor (lxr + l
y
r )|i=0 = 0.1743 in the zero-nominal-interest-rate equilibrium, we find that
relative to the first-best allocation, R&D is underinvested in equilibrium: (lxr + l
y





Proposition 5(i) states that that R&D overinvestment is sufficient but not necessary for Friedman
rule to be suboptimal. Our benchmark case, which features both underinvestment and a positive
23Vaona (2012) and Barro (2013) document a monotonically negative effect of inflation on economic growth.
24Throughout the quantitative analysis, we focus on an empirically realistic case of the inflation rate where π ≤ 15%.
According to FRED, the maximum of annual inflation rate for the US from 1960 to 2020 is 13.5% . Thus, we consider
0.15 as the upper bound of the inflation rate. Correspondingly, the upper bound of the nominal interest rate is 20.63%
in the benchmark case based on the condition i − g(i)− ρ − n = 15%.
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optimal nominal interest rate, supports this result.25 Although a positive nominal interest rate
exacerbates the underinvestment problem in aggregate R&D in this case, it improves welfare by
reducing the inefficient R&D investment in the low productivity sector.
To allow for overinvestment to arise in equilibrium, we consider a lower R&D productivity
level in both sectors by setting ϕx = 0.44 and ϕy = ϕx/1.43 while keeping other parameters at
the benchmark level. This reduces the optimal R&D labor. The equilibrium then features R&D
overinvestment at the zero nominal interest rate. Specifically, we have (lxr + l
y





r = 0.0909. In this case, Proposition 5(i) predicts that given ϕx > ϕy and ξx < ξy, R&D
overinvestment is sufficient for Friedman rule to be suboptimal. This is confirmed in Figure 2,
in which the inflation rate and the welfare level exhibit a positive relation within the range of i,
implying a positive optimal rate of nominal interest i∗. In fact, because both the reduction in total
R&D and the labor reallocation from downstream R&D to upstream R&D are welfare-improving
in this case, the welfare cost of Friedman rule is substantially larger than in the benchmark case:
the welfare difference between the welfare-maximizing equilibrium at the optimal interest rate
(i = 20.18% with π = 15%, the upper bound of the inflation rate) and the equilibrium at i = 0
amounts to 0.767% of annual consumption in the steady state.
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(b) Inflation and social welfare
Figure 2: The overinvestment case (ϕx = 0.44, ϕy = ϕx/1.43)
5.4 Cases with One CIA-Constrained R&D Sector
We now consider the cases in which CIA constraint is present only in one sector, correspond-
ing to our theoretical analysis in Section 4.2. First, Figure 3(a) shows that the rate of economic
growth g still decreases in the inflation rate in the cases where the CIA constraint is only present
in the downstream sector (i.e., the blue solid line for ξx = 0) or the upstream sector (i.e., the
red dotted line for ξy = 0). Given the calibrated parameters, according to Proposition 3, the
growth-enhancing effect of a higher inflation rate, which stems from the cross-R&D-sector effect,
25Define by exp(ρ∆U)− 1 the change in steady-state welfare by the usual equivalent variation in consumption flow.
Within the range of i, we find that the welfare gain is approximately 0.03% of consumption per annum by moving
the equilibrium inflation rate from 15% (the upper bound of inflation) to 1.2% (the welfare-maximizing level). This
welfare gain is much smaller than the results in Chu and Cozzi (2014) without vertically integrated R&D activities.
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is strictly dominated by the growth-decreasing effect, which stems from the manufacturing-R&D-
reallocation effect. Thus, the economic growth rate in these cases continues to be decreasing in
the inflation rate as in our benchmark case.
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(b) Inflation and social welfare
Figure 3: The cases with one constrained sector: {ξx = 0, ξy = 0.775} and {ξx = 0.271, ξy = 0}
Figure 3(b) shows that in the case with a CIA constraint only in the downstream sector
(i.e., the blue solid line for ξx = 0), the welfare increases monotonically within the range of
inflation rate. It indicates that Friedman rule continues to be suboptimal as in the benchmark
case. However, the welfare result is different if the CIA constraint is only present in the upstream
sector (i.e., the red dotted line for ξy = 0): in this case, the welfare decreases monotonically
within the range of inflation rate, indicating that Friedman rule is optimal.
To examine the relation between R&D underinvestment (or overinvestment) and the optimal-
ity of Friedman rule, we compare the first-best labor allocations and the steady-state counter-







r = 0.3799, implying that R&D is underinvested in equilibrium. The subopti-
mality of Friedman rule in this case is consistent with Corollary 1, in that overinvestment is not
necessary for Friedman rule to be suboptimal when only downstream R&D is CIA-constrained.
Moreover, in the case of ξy = 0, we find that R&D is still underivested: (lxr + l
y
r )|i=0 = 0.1721 <
lx∗r = 0.3799. The optimality of Friedman rule in this case is in line with Corollary 2, in that
R&D underinvestment in equilibrium is sufficient for Friedman rule to be optimal when only
upstream R&D is CIA-constrained.
5.5 Inverted-U Relation Between Inflation and Growth
The last exercise is performed to examine the possibility of an inverted-U relation between
the inflation rate and the economic growth rate. Such a connection has been observed in recent
empirical studies such as Bick (2010) and Kremer et al. (2013). Intuitively, this can happen in our
model if the gaps in both CIA constraints and productivity between two sectors are sufficiently
large. Therefore, we consider cases with a higher ϕx and a lower ξx than in the benchmark case.
These changes make the upstream sector even less constrained and more productive. As a result,
the cross-R&D-sector effect is more likely to outweigh the manufacturing-R&D-reallocation effect
24
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(b) Inflation and social welfare
Figure 4: The non-monotonic inflation-growth relation case (ξx = 0.02, ϕx = 3.64)
at low levels of nominal interest rates. We find that when raising the upstream R&D productivity
to ϕx = 3.64 and reducing the upstream CIA constraint parameter to ξx = 0.02, while fixing
other parameters, the rate of economic growth g becomes an inverted-U function of inflation, as
shown in Figure 4(a). In addition, the growth-maximizing inflation rate is found to be around
2.59%, which is in line with the empirical estimates of Ghosh and Phillips (1998) (i.e., 2.5%) and
López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) (i.e., 2.7%). Admittedly, the parameter combination in
this case is quite extreme, but it provides a concrete example in support of Proposition 3.26 Not
surprisingly, Figure 4(b) shows that the level of welfare is increasing in inflation, indicating that
Friedman rule is suboptimal in this case.27
6 Conclusion
This study analyzes the growth and welfare effects of monetary policy in a Schumpeterian
growth model in which both vertical sectors engage in R&D activities under a CIA constraint.
We find that a higher nominal interest rate reallocates resources from the more cash-constrained
R&D sector to the less constrained one. In addition to the usual growth-decreasing effect of a
high interest rate due to increased R&D costs, the cross-sector reallocation of R&D labor can
generate a growth-enhancing effect, which could lead to an inverted-U relation between the
nominal interest rate and economic growth.
Moreover, we examine the necessary and sufficient conditions for the (sub)optimality of Fried-
man rule in relation to the underinvestment and overinvestment of R&D in the decentralized
equilibrium. We find that this relation crucially depends on the relative strength of CIA con-
straints and the relative productivity between the R&D sectors. These factors determine the
interaction among the welfare effects brought about by the reallocation of different types of la-
bor, and thereby determine the optimal design of monetary policy. We show analytically that
26Note that under this new set of parameter values, the expression described in Proposition 3 is positive.
27This exercise features R&D underinvestment at i = 0 (with (lxr + l
y
r )|i=0 = 0.2036 < l
x∗
r = 0.8895), supporting
Proposition 5(i) in that overinvestment is not necessary for the suboptimality of Friedman rule.
25
R&D overinvestment is sufficient but not necessary for the zero nominal rate policy to be subop-
timal as long as the more productive R&D sector is not severely more CIA-constrained than the
less productive R&D sector.
Finally, we calibrate our model using the US data. We show empirically that upstream R&D
investment are associated with higher patent-based measures of productivity and face lower
degrees of financial constraints than downstream R&D does. In our benchmark parameteriza-
tion, the growth-maximizing nominal interest rate is zero, but the welfare-maximizing nominal
interest rate is positive despite aggregate R&D underinvestment at the zero lower bound.
Our study shows both analytically and quantitatively the importance of considering multi-
sector R&D investment in the analysis of monetary-policy effects on growth and welfare. Our
results highlight the complexity of trade-offs in the monetary-policy choice in an environment
with strong sectoral heterogeneity. While we focus on the heterogeneity in CIA constraints and
R&D productivity, many other sectoral heterogeneities affect the real effects of monetary pol-
icy, for example, the cross-sectoral differences in price stickiness (see, for example, Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008)). Incorporating such heterogeneities into the endogenous growth theoretic
framework is a fruitful venue for future research on monetary policy.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions
In this appendix, we show the proof of Proposition 1 for the stability of the BGP equilibrium
in the model and the proof of Proposition 5 for the relation between R&D overinvestment (or
underinvestment) and the (sub)optimality of Friedman rule in the case with CIA constraints on
both R&D sectors.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1





















From equations (9), (15), and (17), we can derive the following law of motion for vy,t:
v̇y,t
vy,t








Likewise, from equations (13), (15), and (17), we can derive the law of motion for vx,t:
v̇x,t
vx,t






























r,t − ρ. (A.6)
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Moreover, because it = i for all t, using the manufacturing-labor share of consumption in (14)



















































Finally, to derive the relation between Ψy,t and l
y


















(µx − 1)(1 + ξyi)































Given that Ψy,t is a control variable and the coefficient on Ψy,t is positive in (A.13), the dynamics
of Ψy,t is characterized by saddle-point stability in this model such that Ψy,t jumps immediately
to its interior steady-state value given by
Ψy =
µxµy[ρ(1 + ϕy/ϕx) + ϕy]
(1 + ξyi) [1 + (µx − 1)/(1 + ξxi)] + µx(µy − 1)
. (A.14)
Equations (A.7) and (A.12) imply that when Ψy,t is stationary, lx,t and l
y
r,t must be stationary,
which in turn implies that lxr,t is stationary as well according to (A.11).
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose that CIA constraints are imposed on both R&D sectors and that upstream R&D is
more productive than downstream R&D (i.e., ϕy < ϕx). Let K denote the expression in the
right-hand side of equation (35):












ϕxξx(µx − 1) + ϕyξyµx(µy − 1)
+(ϕy − ϕx)(ξy − ξx)µx(µx − 1)(µy − 1)
]
.
Therefore, we know that sign(∂U/∂i|i=0) = sign(K). We rewrite the expression of K as follows:
























(ϕx − ϕy)(µy − 1)[(ξy − ξx)µx + ξx]







where the definition of R&D overinvestment η in (33) is used and we denote M ≡ [ln z/(µyρ)](1+
ρ/ϕx + ρ/ϕy)(ϕx − ϕy)(µy − 1)[(ξy − ξx)µx + ξx]. To facilitate this proof, we also denote η̃ ≡
(−M)/{(ϕx ln z/ρ)[ξx(µx − 1) + ξyµx(µy − 1)]}.
Next, we show how the conditions under which the sign of K relates to R&D overinvestment
(and underinvestment) would depend on the relative magnitude of ξx and ξy. Accordingly, two
cases arise as follows.
Case A.2.1. When ξy ≥ ξx, we have M > 0. It follows that K > M > 0 as long as η > 0.
Consequently, under ϕx > ϕy and ξy ≥ ξx, R&D overinvestment is sufficient for Friedman
rule to be suboptimal. In other words, for Friedman rule to be optimal (i.e., K < 0), R&D
underinvestment (i.e., η < 0) in the zero-interest rate equilibrium is a necessary condition.
Moreover, Friedman rule can be suboptimal with R&D underinvestment. This is achieved by
η > η̃ where η̃ < 0, which also supports K > 0. In particular, a low degree of R&D underinvest-
ment (i.e., η is not deeply below zero) under large markup values of µx and µy is more likely to
satisfy the inequality η > η̃.28
Case A.2.2. When ξy < ξx, the sign of M becomes ambiguous. Then there are three subcases to
be considered, depending on the value of µx.
(a) If ξx < [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy, we have M > 0 and η̃ < 0. Therefore, R&D overinvestment
in equilibrium (i.e., η > 0) is sufficient but not necessary for Friedman rule to be suboptimal.
This is because Friedman rule can also be suboptimal (i.e., K > 0) in the presence of R&D
underinvestment (i.e., η < 0) as long as the condition η > η̃ holds. It can be shown that a low
degree of R&D underinvestment (i.e., η is not deeply below zero) under large markup values of
µx and µy is more likely to satisfy the inequality η > η̃.
(b) If ξx > [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy, we have M < 0 and η̃ > 0. Therefore, R&D overinvestment
in equilibrium (i.e., η > 0) is necessary but not sufficient for Friedman rule to be suboptimal.
28It can be shown that there exist threshold values µ̃x and µ̃y of markups above which the sign of K becomes
positive. Derivations are available upon request.
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In other words, R&D underinvestment (i.e., η < 0) is sufficient but not necessary for Friedman
rule to be optimal in this case. This is because the suboptimality of Friedman rule requires the
condition η > η̃ > 0 to hold, which implies that the degree of R&D overinvestment has to be
sufficiently high. Moreover, a high degree of R&D overinvestment (i.e., η is well above zero)
under large markup values of µx and µy is more likely to satisfy the inequality η > η̃.
29
(c) If ξx = [µx/(µx − 1)]ξy, we have M = η̃ = 0. Therefore, R&D overinvestment in equilib-
rium (i.e., η > 0) is necessary and sufficient for Friedman rule to be suboptimal. In other words,
R&D underinvestment in equilibrium (i.e., η < 0) is necessary and sufficient for Friedman rule
to be optimal.
Appendix B. Measures of Upstreamness and R&D Productivity
Following Antràs et al. (2012) and Gofman et al. (2020), we compute an industry-level up-
streamness index using the following matrix equation:
U = A ∗ U + l, (B.1)
where U is a vector representing the unstreamness indexes of 417 private-sector I-O industries,
A is a 417 × 417 adjacency matrix constructed using the Make and Use tables, in which element
Ai,j representing the share of industry i’s output sold to industry j, and l is a vector of ones.
Intuitively, an industry’s upstreamness index is the weighted average of its customer industries’
upstreamness indexes plus 1. Industries producing only goods and services for personal con-
sumption form the bottom layer of production and have the lowest upstreamness index of 1.
Following Hirshleifer et al. (2013), we measure a firm’s R&D productivity (or efficiency) by
its R&D output relative to R&D input. Our first measure of R&D output comes from Kogan et al.
(2017) and is calculated as




where Pf ,t is all patents granted to firm f in year t, Cj is the total number of forward citations
received by patent j up to year 2020, Cj is the average number of forward citations received by
the patents that were granted in the same year as patent j. This scaling is used to adjust for
citation truncation at the sample end, which affects patents granted in different years differently.
As an alternative, we measure Cj by the the average number of citations received by the patents
belonging to the same technology class and granted in the same year as patent j, following
Hirshleifer et al. (2013). This helps to control for citation propensity attributed to differences in
technology fields and leads to our second R&D output measure, RDO(I I) f ,t. If a firm is not
granted any patent in a given year, then both output measures are zero.
We measure a firm’s R&D input by cumulative R&D expenses over five years, assuming an
annual depreciation rate of 20%, following again Hirshleifer et al. (2013). Specifically, the R&D
29Similarly, there exist threshold values µ̃x and µ̃y of markups above which the sign of K becomes positive. Deriva-
tions are available upon request.
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capital of firm f in year t is computed as
RDC f ,t = R&D f ,t + 0.8 ∗ R&D f ,t−1 + 0.6 ∗ R&D f ,t−2 + 0.4 ∗ R&D f ,t−3 + 0.2 ∗ R&D f ,t−4. (B.3)
To account for the average two-year patent application-grant lag, the output variables in year t
are divided by by R&D capital in year t − 2 to yield the R&D output-input ratios. Because both
ratios are highly skewed, we use the natural logarithms of 1 plus these ratios as our productivity
measures:




Prod(I I) f ,t = log(1 +
RDO(I I) f ,t
RDC f ,t−2
). (B.5)
Appendix C. Conditions for the (sub)optimality of Friedman rule in
Comparison to Chu and Cozzi (2014)
In this appendix, we consider two additional cases in which the analytical results in the
current model collapse to those in Chu and Cozzi (2014), in addition to the ξx = [µx/(µx −
1)]ξy case considered in Section 4. We focus on the case in Chu and Cozzi (2014) with no CIA
constraints on consumption and manufacturing and with inelastic labor supply.
C.1 Homogeneous R&D Productivity
Intuitively, if R&D productivity is the same in both sectors (i.e., ϕx = ϕy = ϕ), then our
two-R&D-sector model should behave effectively the same as a one-R&D-sector model. This can
be shown explicitly.





















It is straightforward to show that R&D overinvestment in equilibrium (i.e., lxr |i=0 + l
y





r or 1 − (ϕlnz)(1 + 2ρ/ϕ)/(µxµyρ) > 0) is sufficient and necessary for Friedman rule to be
suboptimal. In other words, R&D underinvestment in equilibrium (i.e., lxr |i=0 + l
y





or 1− (ϕlnz)(1+ 2ρ/ϕ)/(µxµyρ) < 0) is sufficient and necessary for Friedman rule to be optimal.
Therefore, the productivity heterogeneity across sectors is a prerequisite for the cross-R&D-
sector effect to have an impact on the welfare. If the sectoral productivities are identical, the
cross-R&D-sector effect becomes irrelevant. Then the two R&D sectors work effectively as one,
yielding only the manufacturing-R&D-reallocation effect on the welfare. As a result, the relations
between suboptimal R&D investment and the suboptimality of Friedman rule in this model with
two R&D sectors are the same as in Chu and Cozzi (2014) with a single R&D sector.
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C.2 Degenerate Downstream R&D
Our model also yields identical results to those in Chu and Cozzi (2014) if R&D in the down-
stream (final-good) sector shrinks to zero. We verify this intuition by considering three different
scenarios (namely, the CIA constraint is imposed in both sectors, in only upstream R&D, in only
downstream R&D, respectively). To facilitate the comparison, we follow Chu and Cozzi (2014) to
set the strength of the CIA constraint to unity when the constraint is present in the sector(s), and
we assume ϕx > ϕy as in the main text.
C.2.1 CIA constraints on two sectors
The steady-state equilibrium labor allocations (23)-(25) in the case of CIA constraints on two
sectors (i.e., ξx = ξy = 1) are given by
lx =







































Case C.2.1. Suppose that the productivity in upstream R&D is higher relative to downstream
R&D, i.e., ϕx > ϕy. Equation (C.3) and the non-negativity of l
y
r imply that downstream R&D
labor l
y
r is zero for all i ≥ 0 if µy ≤ [µx(1+ ρ/ϕx + ρ/ϕy)]/[µx + (1+ ρ/ϕx)] (because l
y
r increases
in µy and decreases in i). In this case, the two-sector model reduces to a single R&D model as in

























r = 0 and (C.5)-(C.6) into the BGP lifetime utility function in (29), differentiating





















Therefore, it is straightforward to show that R&D overinvestment in equilibrium (i.e., lxr |i=0 +
l
y
r |i=0 > l
x∗
r |i=0 + l
y∗
r |i=0 or 1 − (ln z/µx)(1 + ρ/ϕx) > 0) is sufficient and necessary for Friedman




lx∗r |i=0 + l
y∗
r |i=0 or 1 − (ln z/µx)(1 + ρ/ϕx) < 0) is sufficient and necessary for Friedman rule to
be optimal; these are the same conditions as in Chu and Cozzi (2014).
C.2.2 CIA constraint on downstream R&D
Recall that the steady-state equilibrium labor allocations (23)-(25) in the case of a CIA con-
straint on downstream R&D (i.e., ξx = 0 and ξy = 1) are given by
lx =






































Case C.2.2. Suppose that the productivity in upstream R&D is higher relative to downstream
R&D, i.e., ϕx > ϕy. Equation (C.9) and the non-negativity of l
y
r imply that downstream R&D
labor l
y
r becomes zero for all i ≥ 0 if µy ≤ 1 + (ρ/ϕy)/(1 + ρ/ϕx) (because l
y
r increases in µy
and decreases in i). In this case, the two-sector model reduces to a single R&D model as in
Chu and Cozzi (2014). Nevertheless, this is a trivial case, given that the other labor allocations
are independent of i: lx = (1 + ρ/ϕx)/µx and lxr = [(µx − 1)/µx](1 + ρ/ϕx) − ρ/ϕx. This is
because when the CIA constraint is present in downstream R&D and downstream R&D is zero,
monetary policy is irrelevant to the steady-state equilibrium labor allocations. Therefore, the
welfare analysis of the nominal interest rate is not applied.
C.2.3 CIA constraint on upstream R&D
Recall that the steady-state equilibrium labor allocations (23)-(25) in the case of a CIA con-
straint on upstream R&D (i.e., ξx = 1 and ξy = 0) are given by
lx =
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy



































Case C.2.3. Suppose that the productivity in upstream R&D is higher relative to downstream
R&D, i.e., ϕx > ϕy. Consider an empirically relevant upper bound of the nominal interest rate, ī.
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Equation (C.12) and the non-negativity of l
y
r imply that downstream R&D labor l
y
r becomes zero
for all i ∈ [0, ī] if µy ≤ 1+ {(ρ/ϕy)[1+ (µx − 1)/(1+ ī)]}/[µx(1+ ρ/ϕx)] (because l
y
r increases in
both µy and i). In this case, the two-sector model reduces to a single R&D model as in Chu and
Cozzi (2014), and the other labor allocations are given by equations (C.5) and (C.6). Substituting
l
y
r = 0 and (C.5)-(C.6) into the BGP lifetime utility function in (29), differentiating ρU with respect
to i and evaluating it at i = 0 yields equation (C.7). Therefore, it is straightforward to show that
R&D overinvestment in equilibrium (i.e., lxr |i=0 + l
y
r |i=0 > l
x∗
r |i=0 + l
y∗
r |i=0 or 1 − (ln z/µx)(1 +
ρ/ϕx) > 0) is sufficient and necessary for Friedman rule to be suboptimal. In other words,
R&D underinvestment in equilibrium (i.e., lxr |i=0 + l
y
r |i=0 < l
x∗
r |i=0 + l
y∗
r |i=0 or 1 − (ln z/µx)(1 +
ρ/ϕx) < 0) is sufficient and necessary for Friedman rule to be optimal; these are the same
conditions as in Chu and Cozzi (2014).
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